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Looking through contributions about microeconomic theory, from classics 
to modern theory, it is possible to identify various attitudes on the role that 
firms play in the market. To simplify the existing multiplicity of opinion, two 
distinct positions can be recognized: 1) the first one considers the theory of the 
firm, its choices about price and production as ruled by consumer sovereignty, 
assuming that it is the eagerness to buy that drives the market. The entrepre-
neur’s and consumer’s interests converge thanks to automatic mechanisms 
leading to equilibrium. It is well-known that neoclassical economists can be as-
cribed to this trend of study. 2) the second position, on the other hand, consid-
ers the side of production as having a higher incidence in the identification of 
market equilibrium, as firms are able to set prices and co-ordinate demand be-
haviour. This turn-round in causality defines a market where the demand-
supply relationship does not follow the rules of competitive-marginalist equi-
librium, but alternative principles. The aim of this study is to analyse the con-
tribution of Post-Keynesian scholars about this theme in the belief that the fun-
damental assumptions and conclusions they have drawn represent an alterna-
tive to the traditional theory, and are worth being considered carefully. 
However, in the identification of the theoretical foundations of Post-
Keynesian microeconomics theory, one can run into the difficulty of reducing 
to few unification principles the content of very different contributions, which 
often stand out for their critical positions vis-à-vis orthodox theory rather than 
for setting up the parts of a single alternative paradigm
1. 
Besides, Post-Keynesians have a strong taste for macroeconomics themes, 
rather than for microeconomics ones, since they believe that the macro aggre-
gates determine the behaviour of small decision-making units. In fact, looking 
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1 The criticism of neoclassical theory of the firm goes back to Sraffa’s contribution. Then, 
many scholars devoted themselves to the study of alternative theories on firm and industry stress-
ing either the characteristic of managerial ability (Berle and Means 1932), or the institutional role 
of firms in the market (Galbraith 1963 and 1968), or the oligopolistic nature of the production of 
goods (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Rothchilds 1947). at this literature, one can find a lot of contributions on this subject: the most re-
puted (Kalecki 1954, and, for an expansion of this, Asimakopulos 1975 and 
Cowling 1982) explain the formation of prices and produced quantities as the 
results of decision-making process of firms as a whole. These theories set 
themselves out as theories of investment decisions, profit accumulation, and the 
conflicting nature of income distribution. This point of view, however, is sub-
mitted to the criticism of those who argue that Post-Keynesian theory does not 
possess persuasive microeconomics bases and that, even though it can be main-
tained that in the process of aggregation the firms behave uniformly in influ-
encing aggregate production and income distribution, it is always necessary to 
define the rules that allow each unit to take its production choices. 
Most recently, some scholars have committed themselves to define the 
rules of such a decision-making process and to clarify the reasons why the in-
terests between consumers and producers in the market do not converge. In so 
doing, they have tried to provide a microeconomic foundation to the distribu-
tive conflict identified at an aggregate level. These different contributions un-
derline various dimensions of the undertaker’s decision-making mechanism. 
However,  I believe that they share some common elements, as they are charac-
terized by a common global vision that brings about a persuasive alternative to 
the theoretical system of neoclassical microeconomics. 
The aim of the present study is that of presenting the key elements of the 
Post-Keynesian global vision on the theory of the firm, and of explaining why 
price mechanisms prevail over quantity-determining mechanism.  
The paper is articulated as follows: the second section contemplates the 
production function and the associated cost function in the belief that the as-
sumptions of Post-Keynesians are the base of an alternative microeconomic 
theory. In the third section, then, I present the theory of price formation and of 
the shape of the supply curve. The fourth and final section draws some conclu-
sions. 
 
2. The foundation of microeconomics: production and cost func-
tions 
 
The foundation of the Post-Keynesian microeconomic theory is provided 
by the shape of the production function. 
As a matter of fact, Post-Keynesian economists believe that the law of de-
creasing marginal returns cannot be accepted since the organization of the 
modern production structure and the nature of technology cannot be described 
by the substitutability of factors of production. In fact, they maintain that: 1. it is impossible to draw a straightforward line between the contribution 
of capital and the contribution of work to production as, in the modern market 
economies, these two factors do not have an autonomous life
2. 
2. each capital incorporates a given technology and is conceived to be used 
in a peculiar way
3. 
From these simple propositions, which Post-Keynesians believe that can be 
drawn from observed facts, derive important results for the production func-
tion. In fact, once the above mentioned assumptions are accepted, it ensues 
that: 
a.  it is impossible to single out the respective marginal productivity of 
every factor of production
4; 
b.  it cannot hold that product per worker is higher when the plant ca-
pacity is underused
5. 
In other words, one cannot use the production function to define the equi-
librium level of employment and the requirements for firms’ profit maximiza-
tion
6. Therefore, it remains an open question how the single firm chooses its 
plant dimension and the relative volumes of employment and production. 
According to Post-Keynesian scholars, the firm equips itself with the capi-
tal amount, that, associated to a given number of workers, generates a product 
value that can satisfy the effectual demand and guarantee the programmed 
profit margin. In other words, the production function is ex-ante at fixed coeffi-
cients
7 and the dimension of plants is decided by expected demand. Further-
 
2 Joan Robinson was the first to handle this problem, inaugurating the famous debate on 
capital theory. See Robinson (1953), (1956), (1967) and (1971). For an exhaustive study of this 
subject see Harcourt (1972). 
3 Cfr. Robinson and Eatwell (1973). 
4 In practice, it is not possibile to isolate the effects of labour productivity deriving from 
capital accumulation from those coming from “technical progress” (or, to use the jargon of 
economists, the movement “along” the production function from those of the function itself). All 
that can be said is that the growth of productivity will be so much higher as technical change “ac-
tivated by the new investment” grows. Cfr. Kaldor (1966). 
5 “In the traditional view, substitution between various inputs is always possible, both in the 
short and in the long run. In the short term, for instance, it always possible to increase produc-
tion, by having more labour working on the same machine, thus decreasing the capital/labour 
ratio and, therefore, the marginal physical product of labour”, Lavoie (1992), p. 119. 
6 These features of the production function also exist in neoclassical theory, but they are 
limited to a peculiar case of the general condition of perfect substitutability. Therefore, the de-
bate between these two schools of thought moves on to a different level, where the ability of the 
general case to represent the facts is compared. The question is then: Is there enough substitut-
ability in an economic system to confirm the results of neoclassical theory? See Lavoie (1992). 
7 Firms, in deciding the technique of production to adopt at a certain time, instead of being 
confronted to a whole range of techniques among which to choose, can be constrained to a single more, since in the short term a reduction of demand might occur, to which it is 
not possible to answer suddenly by modifying the dimension of plants, it is rea-
sonable to think that machinery is on that occasion underused. As a conse-
quence, returns are ex-post constant rather than marginally decreasing, since 
the machinery produces a constant output per hour of work associated to it
8. 
Assuming for simplicity sake a broad range of possible uses of plants – or, 
which is equivalent, infinite divisibility of capital – it is possible to define the 
production function in a continuous interval: 
 
Y = πN for every N < Nmax 
Y = Ymax for every N > Nmax. 
 






“best use” technique, that is to say, the production function ex-ante may be a “single point”. Cfr. 
Harcourt and Kenyon (1976) and Eichner (1976). 
8 “In our pattern the technique is such that, in all sectors, the output per worker remains con-
stant until the existing capacity is completely used. When exceeding the point of full use of pro-
duction capacity, the output cannot grow. Cfr. Robinson and Eatwell (1973). The figure shows that, below maximum plant capacity it is always possible 
to increase the output by increasing the number of workers occupied, but above 
the co-ordinates (Ymax, Nmax) this is no longer possible unless by varying the 
quantity of capital or changing the technique. The result is that above a certain 
amount of employment the marginal productivity will be null and the produc-
tion function will loose its economic significance. 
 
From the assumptions related to production derives the particular shape of 
the functions of average variable costs and of marginal costs, which, in Post-
Keynesian analysis, do not follow the trends commonly reported in the most 
widespread handbooks
9. What has been stated above clearly shows that the av-
erage cost and marginal cost curves maintain an unchanged trend as the output 
varies both in the short and in the long run. In fact, the variation of the ratio be-
tween the price of capital and the price of labour does not alter the choice of the 
quantity of output produced in the short and in the long run (the isoquant 
curves are angular) but only the height of the cost functions. 
It is possible to chart what stated above. The average variable cost function 
– to make description realistic – can be assumed as decreasing until it achieves 
a certain degree of plant working efficiency; beyond this value it is constant 
until it reaches the capacity limit. Above this limit, the function will become 
very slanting, as a huge increase of costs is necessary to obtain a very small (if 
not null) growth of the output. 
The marginal cost is similarly affected by the peculiar trend of total costs. 
After an increasing length, it becomes constant and takes the same value of av-
erage variable costs. When it goes over the maximum productive capacity it 
rises more than average variable costs. This is reported in figure 2, in which the 
dotted line describes marginal costs (Cma) and the solid line the average vari-
able costs (CMv)
10. 
According to these assumptions, there is not a single cost minimization 
condition ensuring the efficient use of resources, but a variety of “optimum” 
conditions, all identifiable in the horizontal part of the average and marginal 
costs curves. 
The firms, therefore, could be in the position of underusing plants without 
necessarily waiving the profit margin from each product unit. 
 
 
9 The only microeconomics handbook containing alternative view is Koutsoyiannis (1979). 
For some reports see also Graziani (1985). 
10 This description can be found in Eichner and Kregel (1975), Eichner (1976), Koutsoyian-





Overcapacity does not stem from an inefficient workings condition of the 
firm, but from the fact that the equipment is underused because of suddenly 
changes in demand, which the entrepreneur is not able to control. Possible re-
verse events – like a sudden increase of consumers’ purchases – can induce the 
entrepreneur – at the moment of the initial decision – to oversize the plant giv-
ing rise to a steady condition of underutilization
11. 
 
3. The mechanism of pricing and the industry supply curve 
 
Post-Keynesian scholars suppose that the market is not characterized by a 
stiff competition and that, for this, the firms are price-makers rather than price-
takers. The firms do not consider the price as a given quantity determined by 
the market; instead, they fix the sale value on their own initiative, by adding a 
margin to prime costs. In this way, the price comes out from the so-called 
mark-up formula 
 
11 This argument is put forward by most scholars engaged on this subject. Koutsoyiannis has 
transferred it into an handbook arguing that firms establish the size of plants so to settle “some-
where between the two thirds and the three quarters of their global capacity”. Koutsoyiannis 
(1979), p. 118.  
p = CMv(1 + γ), 
 
where γ is the profit margin. 
This mechanism of pricing does not allow to embrace the traditional theory 
in the identification of prices and produced quantities. According to the ortho-
dox approach, only the existence of non perfectly competitive markets – with a 
high level of demand compared to the size of supply – could be responsible for 
firms’ extra profits. In any case, however, the maximization conditions are sat-
isfied. Accordingly, the mark-up turns out to be a special case generated by 
market distortions, and the profit maximization condition that equalize revenue 
and marginal cost  
 
(1)        Rma = Cma 
 
is still satisfied. 
In fact, because of the relationship between marginal revenue and the elas-
ticity of demand curve (η), it must be 
 
(2)        Rma = p(η - 1)/η 
 
Taking account of (1) and (2) and of the assumption that marginal costs are 
constant and equivalent to average variable costs it must be: 
 
p(η - 1)/η = Cmv 
 
that is, the price must be equivalent to 
 
p = [(η/η- 1)] Cmv 
 
The analogy with the mark-up formula is evident. In fact, it is possible to 
identify a definite relationship between margin on costs and elasticity of de-
mand: 
 
(η/η- 1) = (1 + γ) 
 
But, according to Post-Keynesian scholars this reasoning is weak from the 
beginning, as the equality in the margin of costs and revenue cannot suggest to 
firms the optimum quantity of production. 
Pricing operation is dictated by the will to gain a margin of profit from each 
product unit. The causal relationship between produced quantities and prices that can be found in orthodox theory is here inverted as the firms first establish 
the margin on costs and only after the size of the equipment, so to produce the 
quantity of goods demanded by the market at the price they have fixed
12. 
In other words – given the above assumptions about the production func-
tion – each firm’s marginal revenue is represented by a horizontal line (with 
infinite elasticity) always lying above the average costs curve. Therefore, con-
sidering also the assumptions about the cost function, two circumstances may 
occur: a) if the margin is null, the firm’s marginal revenue curve converges 
with the marginal cost function, and the optimum amount of quantity is inde-
terminate; b) if the margin is positive the marginal revenue meets the marginal 
cost in correspondence with the maximum plant capacity. This confirms that 
the firms are equipped with that quantity of capital that allows them to satisfy 
the market demand and to gain the programmed profit margin. In other words, 
the relationship of cause and effect goes from the price to the quantity and the 
same solution could be attained with different profit margins and different plant 
sizes. 
 
12 These considerations are confirmed by the circumstance that modern markets are charac-
terized by an oligopolistic system in which each firm – once the global quantity of industry 
goods to put into the market has been fixed – sells on the basis of an agreement with the leader, 
without any possibility of changing it by itself. “The price that will be charged by the megacorp 
for its product during the current pricing period is determined by the industry as a whole acting 
through  the price leader. Since the price charged by the industry as a whole during the current 
pricing period will be constant, whatever the rate of capacity utilization, the average revenue and 
the marginal revenue will also be constant. This gives the revenue curve the appearance of an 
infinitely elastic demand curve”. Eichner (1976), pp. 43-4. This could be true also for a price-
leader firm, because a change in prices could be responsible for the loss of leadership.








Figure 3 describes what stated above. The marginal revenue line (Rma) lies 
constantly above the variable average costs curve (CMv) (in the case not de-
scribed of γ = 0 it converges on it). The figure shows the firm’s profit decision 
according to the assumptions above stated. The area included between the 
curve obtained adding to variable average costs a constant margin, that repre-
sents the above-described marginal revenue, and the unit costs curve (Cu) 
represents the profits area, which comes out to be maximized in correspon-
dence with the productive level matching the maximum utilization of equip-
ment (Ymax)
13. 
This price mechanism suffers from a limit of uncertainty since the firm – 
given the downward-sloping industry demand curve – might decide to reduce 
the size of the plant and add a very high margin on costs to obtain the highest 
possible profit for each unit of product, or conversely it might cut the margin 
and increase the quantity of product
14. 
 
13 This fact does not exclude that the firms decide not to utilize the full equipment capacity. 
In this case, as a matter of fact, they add to the goal of gaining a profit also a will to face a possi-
ble rise of demand. The conditions for price setting do not change, of course. 
14 “The crucial question then becomes: how do firms decide on the value of the margin of 
profit over direct cost or unit cost?”, Lavoie (1992), p. 137. Conceivable answers to this question are different and all seize some fea-
tures of the pricing process. They underline different aspects of the equilibrium 
of the firm and offer altogether a persuasive answer to this question. 
The prevailing solution considers the profit margin as tied to the goal to 
achieve a rate of growth of the firm’s activity in the long term
15, or better, tied 
to the need to raise money on the market for refinancing the firm in the follow-
ing periods. The latter operation could represent an alternative to bank financ-
ing when the rate of interest is too high to be sustained
16. 
Moreover, the mark-up would be a historically determined value depending 
on the extent of he conflict over distribution and on the relationships of produc-
tion in the market under examination
17. 
Further than that, there are – in the opinion of Post-Keynesian scholars – 
objective limits to the growth of prices, which amount to:  
a)  a will to make entry barriers strong enough to restrict competition 
(if, for example, the price were too high, other firms could simply 
run into the sector, sell at a cheaper price, and subtract part of the 
market to existing firms; therefore, the higher is the degree of mo-
nopoly, the higher is the mark-up that firms may add, avoiding the 
coming of other firms into the market
18;  
b)  b) public intervention, which, in case of exorbitant prices, acts in or-
der to make goods more accessible to the public. 
In other words, the profit is an extra profit because it represents a goal a-
priori established by the firm. A larger competition can cut the mark-up and 
make the price equivalent to unit costs, although it is very unlikely that this cir-
cumstance may occur, as the selling value is set on the basis of the size of the 
sector’s entry barriers. 
Therefore, perfect competition reduces to be a peculiar case in the general 
conditions of the market functioning, and in no case, given the above assump-
tions about the production function, the rules of marginalist distribution can be 
applied to it. 
From the assumptions described until now, it is possible to draw some con-
clusions about the form taken by the product supply curve of the whole indus-
trial sector. He latter is described (see figure 4) by the curve of average variable 
costs raised with a mark-up. This curve is horizontal until it reaches the maxi-
 
15 The best known models stating this theory are Eichner (1976), and Harcourt and Kenyon 
(1976). 
16 See Eichner (1980). This formulation represents the microeconomic basis of the determi-
nation of mark-up at a macroeconomic level elaborated by Weintraub (1973). 
17 Robinson (1942) and (1977). But the argument was accepted by Kaldor. See Kaldor 
(1985).  
18 See Kalecki (1938). mum plant capacity, becoming very steep beyond this value consistently with 
the assumption that a higher degree of plant utilization cannot be attained or 











Therefore, for each q < q0 the price is p = CMv (1+γ), while for each q ≥ q0 
the price comes out to be higher and is determined by the height of the demand 
curve. Thus, if undertakers correctly estimate (D0) or overestimate demand (D1) 
with regard to its actual value, they can always achieve the programmed profit 
margin, even if, in the second case the profit amount will be lower. If they un-
derestimate it (D2) with regard to its actual value, the consumer pressure could 
drive price up allowing the achievement of higher margins. In the long term, 
then, the plant will be sized in such a way that it can exactly satisfy expected 
demand. 
 
4. Some conclusions 
 The observed features of Post-Keynesian microeconomic theory can be 
brought to a single common matrix, that is the effort to provide an alternative 
pattern to orthodox theory. 
The different elements of the pattern identified in the previous pages have 
in common the refusal of the conditions posited by neoclassical theory, accord-
ing to which the market, once the flexibility of monetary values is assured, is 
able to render the interests of producers and consumers compatible. 
The alternative assumptions formulated by Post-Keynesian theory describe 
a market where prices, set by the undertaker, coordinate the demand behaviour. 
From this derives that the firms have the power to fix the price, influencing in 
that way the distribution of national income. 
Two considerations arise from this analysis. First, it is no more possible to 
think, as the orthodox theory does, that the equilibrium of the firm can be asso-
ciated with conditions of maximum satisfaction of traders. Even though the 
competition between firms is stiffer, it is likely that the mark-up will be re-
duced or cancelled. But since also in case of pure competition the income can-
not be distributed according to the principles of marginal productivity – since 
following the assumptions made on the production function, the marginal 
product of labour equals the average product and Euler’s theorem no longer 
applies – it is necessary to derive alternative distribution rules. Post-Keynesian 
scholars conclude that the total output value is distributed according to the 
market power of parties. 
Second, the potential points of equilibrium are many. In fact, it is possible 
that, in correspondence with a given value of monetary demand expected by 
the undertaker, different prices and quantities depending on the dimension of 
the programmed mark-up and on the plant size
19. 
All of this can be summed up in the statement that the economic system 
does not tend by nature to an ideal state of equilibrium, because operators are 
not all on the same level. The equilibrium position achieving a Post-Keynesian 
model arises from the market power owned by each part and from the capacity 
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